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Inequality in the Social Mind: Social Comparison
and Support for Redistribution
Meghan Condon, Loyola University Chicago
Amber Wichowsky, Marquette University

Income inequality is fundamentally relational in nature, but research on the American public’s response to it tends to
examine individuals in isolation, concluding that support for redistribution is unresponsive to inequality. We focus
instead on perceptions of relative socioeconomic position, which we manipulate experimentally through imagined
social interactions with high- or low-status others. We ﬁnd that subjects who make social comparisons between
themselves and someone who is socioeconomically advantaged perceive their own status as lower, assess their own
socioeconomic status more accurately, and become more supportive of social welfare spending, even though we provide
no factual information about the income distribution to subjects in the experiment. Our ﬁndings demonstrate that
Americans respond with support for redistribution when conditions facilitate upward social comparison. We argue for
a shift in scholarly attention to the structural factors that keep rising upper-tail inequality socially invisible.

T

here is a puzzling disconnect between rising income
inequality and public opinion in the United States.
Why (despite the substantial increases in income
inequality) haven’t Americans demanded more economic
redistribution? Public opinion data suggest that US policy
makers have not faced much electoral pressure to redistribute income downward (Ashok, Kuziemko, and Washington 2015; Kelly and Enns 2010; Kenworthy and McCall
2008). Explanations for this inconsistency often characterize
Americans as ignorant (lacking the factual knowledge to
respond rationally to growing inequality; e.g., Osberg and
Smeeding 2006) or tolerant (accepting of economic inequality because of ideology or deeply held beliefs about mobility;
e.g., Feldman and Zaller 1992; Lipset 1997). Both of these
approaches separate the individual from social context and
focus on absolute, rather than relative, characteristics.
The canonical political economic model gives more attention to the changes to relative socioeconomic position that
happen when inequality grows, predicting that governments
will face greater pressure to redistribute income as market inequality increases and the median voter falls farther from the

top of the income distribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981;
Romer 1975). But the line of inquiry ﬂowing from this model
emphasizes objective status, typically operationalized with income, ignoring individuals’ subjective perception of status
and social experience. None of these approaches has been able
to offer a satisfactory explanation for the absence of a robust
American response to growing inequality. We argue that resolving the puzzle requires a step that scholars have not taken,
focusing inquiry on perception of relative status and its basis in
social experience.
Our social perception approach is grounded in two simple
ideas. First, status and inequality are by deﬁnition relational;
second, individuals make sense of relational phenomena by
comparing themselves to others. Therefore, we begin from the
premise that to understand how Americans respond to inequality, we must investigate the particular social comparisons
they make, and how these comparisons shape their sense of the
socioeconomic hierarchy, their place in it, and their views about
what, if anything, they want government to do to change it. The
social perception approach draws attention to a new possibility:
given the variation in the accessibility of referent groups,
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individuals with the exact same objective position, knowledge
of economic facts, and ideology may be exposed to, or pay
attention to, different social contrasts and as a result may draw
very different conclusions about their relative standing and
what they would like government to do to address income
differences.
If this is the case, it is possible that opinion is insulated from
inequality because Americans are not experiencing the crossclass social comparisons that help people perceive relational
phenomena like status and inequality accurately and make
inequality meaningful and salient as people form opinions. In
particular, based on decades of social psychological research
about social comparison to attitude formation (e.g., Tajfel 1981;
Turner 1985) and comparative political economy literature
about the speciﬁc characteristics of the income distribution that
drive support for the welfare state (Lupu and Pontusson 2011),
we expect social comparison with the wealthy, what we call
“upward comparison,” to induce a perception of social distance and increase demand for social spending. These are exactly the sort of cross-class comparisons that are most limited
in the United States today. Increasing class segregation, especially the social isolation of the wealthy (Reardon and Bischoff
2011; Watson 2009), along with an ego-protecting psychological tendency to avoid comparison with others who are better off
(Wheeler and Miyake 1992; Wood 1989), could be preventing
individuals from thinking about the social comparisons that
could link inequality to support for redistribution.
The ﬁrst step in investigating those expectations is testing
whether Americans’ opinions about social spending change
when they are induced to think in terms of particular crossclass social comparisons, holding constant individual attributes
and attitudes. To accomplish this, we conducted a large-scale
study of Americans’ opinions about inequality and social welfare policy in which we implemented a novel survey experiment. We manipulated individuals’ perceptions of the socioeconomic hierarchy and their place in it, not by providing
information to subjects but by asking them to imagine social
interactions with prototypical members of the upper or lower
classes. By varying the social position of the imagined conversation partner, we induced subjects to perceive greater social
distance from the other person and perceive their own socioeconomic status as higher or lower. We exploit the resulting
variation to examine how perceptions of status and social distance affect attitudes about the welfare state. Critically, randomization allows us to hold individual resources, factual
knowledge, ideology, and values constant, isolating the causal
effects of status perceptions on opinion.
We show that subjects who make social comparisons between themselves and another person who is very well off are
indeed induced to feel greater social distance from the socio-

economic elite. They respond with a more accurate perception
of their own socioeconomic status and greater support for
social spending, even though we provide no factual information to subjects in the experiment. By showing that political
preferences are responsive to status when it is framed in social
comparative terms, our results indicate that American unresponsiveness to growing inequality may be due to social forces
that insulate Americans from upward social comparison,
rather than individual characteristics that render Americans’
opinions immune to status. We redirect future inquiry to examine the structural and psychological conditions that guide
perceptions of economic inequality as a social phenomenon.

INEQUALITY IS RELATIONAL
Americans are not demanding more redistribution in the
face of growing income disparities, but the United States
is not the only country where we see this so-called Robin
Hood paradox (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). When comparative scholars look across nations and focus on the relative
distance between the middle class and the wealthy, rather
than overall inequality, they ﬁnd an intuitive result: countries redistribute more income downward when the distance
between the middle and top of the income distribution is
larger than the distance between the bottom and the middle
of the income distribution (Kristov, Lindert, and McClelland
1992; Lupu and Pontusson 2011). Drawing on individual-level
survey data from more than a dozen industrialized democracies, Lupu and Pontusson further show that middle-income
voters are more supportive of redistribution when their objective income places them closer to the poor than to the rich.
These intriguing ﬁndings suggest a speciﬁc process of individual opinion formation—that it is not simply inequality but
perception of relative status that causes opinion change about
redistribution; in fact, the authors hint at this possibility. But we
know little about whether the individual psychological process
implied by this cross-national observational study actually
occurs.1 No study to date tests the microfoundations of these
macro patterns by examining whether individuals actually feel
more socially distant from the wealthy or closer to the poor
when the income distribution is heavily skewed to the right, or
whether such a perception of distance changes opinion.
There is suggestive evidence from experiments with small
convenience samples that sense of subjective status relative to
others has a stronger relationship with redistributive attitudes

1. These patterns may also reﬂect unmeasured differences across nations.
For example, more recent research by Alt and Iversen suggests that redistributive preferences are “less affected by social or economic distance between
groups once labor market segmentation is taken into account” (2017, 34).
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than absolute markers of status like education and income (e.g.,
Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2015), and that redistributive attitudes
can be sensitive to changes in these perceptions. For example, in
one recent experiment conducted in Argentina, researchers
measured perceptions of relative income position and then
randomly assigned some subjects to see their actual ranking
(Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013). Posttreatment, subjects were asked about their support for redistribution. Respondents who were informed that they were relatively poorer
than they had thought became more supportive of redistribution, and the size of the treatment effect was substantial, about
half the difference in support between the top and bottom
quintiles of individuals in the control group.2 Another study,
this time in Sweden, came to similar conclusions (Karadja,
Mollerstrom, and Seim 2016). Researchers found that although
nearly three out of four respondents missed their relative income position by a decile or more in an initial query, correcting
misperceptions about relative economic status changed their
preferences for redistribution. However, in this case, conservative respondents who learned that they were relatively richer
than they thought became less supportive of redistribution.
Taken together, these studies suggest that individually tailored
information about relative economic status can have an effect
on redistributive attitudes. But outside of an experimental environment, individuals almost never confront customized information about their own relative income.

HUMANS ARE SOCIAL THINKERS
This brings us to our second basic proposition: people regularly
make sense of relational phenomena through a process of social
comparison, understanding the world and their place within it
by making comparisons with other people (Tajfel and Turner
1979; Tajfel 1981). Social comparison helps individuals accurately assess their abilities, characteristics, and preferences
(Festinger 1954) and to process information more efﬁciently
(Fiske and Taylor 1991; Mussweiler and Epstude 2009). It also
satisﬁes deep psychological needs for positive self-image and
group identity (Tajfel 1982; Turner 1978). People routinely,
often unconsciously, categorize people by constructing symbolic boundaries that deﬁne views about deservedness and desirability (Lamont and Molnár 2002). These comparison-based
social identities, in turn, provide “the fundamental basis of
people’s social orientations toward others” (Turner and
Onorato 1999, 37). In all of these ways, social comparisons
help people make sense of their place in society (Brewer 1991)
and shape subjective perceptions of well-being (Adler et al.
2. Information had no effect on respondents with “unbiased” perceptions
of their relative income rank or on those with subjective perceptions that were
lower than their objective ranking in the income distribution.
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2000; Luttmer 2004). Social comparisons have been shown to
affect a wide range of behaviors, from consumption habits
(Frank 2013) and self-improvement efforts (Bandura 1986)
to social protest (Gurr 1970; Runciman 1966). In short, the
human mind is an engine of social comparison.
Therefore, we theorize that perceptions of and reactions to
inequality arise not just from absolute status, broad trends in
inequality, or even objective relative status but in large part
from which comparisons we make and how often we think in
social contrast-based terms. This social comparative thinking is
inﬂuenced by residential patterns, workplace interactions, and
racial context. Geographic segregation, for example, can obstruct the social perception of inequality. American communities are increasingly segregated by income (Owens 2016;
Reardon and Bischoff 2011; Watson 2009), resulting in the
social isolation of income groups from one another and decreasing the opportunity for cross-class social comparison.
Importantly, the visibility of income difference has declined
during the same period in which inequality has grown. Schools
(Owens, Reardon, and Jencks 2016), civic organizations (Skocpol 2004), and workplaces (Autor 2011) all provide limited opportunities for cross-class contact. Families and social networks
are also heavily stratiﬁed; Americans today are more likely to
marry someone with the same socioeconomic background
(Mare 2016). Robert Putnam reviews the literature on geographic and social segregation and calls the current state of
affairs “a kind of incipient classapartheid” (2015, 39). And today
it is the rich—not the poor—who are the most socially isolated
from other Americans (Reardon and Bischoff 2011), meaning
that for most Americans, upward cross-class comparisons are
contextually restricted. Although recent research points to how
the spatial isolation of afﬂuence reduces the empathy of the rich
(e.g., leading the wealthy elite to develop inaccurate, overly
positive perceptions of social problems; Thal 2017), we know
little about how this class segregation and geographic inequality
affects the opinions of less afﬂuent Americans.
Furthermore, factors beyond contextual availability structure the comparisons that people make. In particular, individuals tend to avoid thinking about upward comparisons
when they feel threatened, anxious, or insecure. The tendency
to avoid upward comparison may be directly related to rising
inequality. While upward comparisons are uncomfortable,
downward comparisons can make people feel better about
themselves (see, e.g., Taylor, Wood, and Lichtman 1983). So
individuals who perceive their status as falling (e.g., due to
rising inequality) and feel anxious may be more likely to make
ego-boosting downward social comparisons, focusing on those
who are worse off as a way to counter inequality’s threat to selfesteem (Fiske 2011). A social approach to public opinion leads
us to expect that the absence of available upward comparisons
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and high levels of insecurity in the American public may be
suppressing upward comparison, inﬂating status perception,
and suppressing support for government action. To investigate
this possibility, the ﬁrst step is to test the basic psychological
mechanism and ask whether Americans’ perceptions of relative
status and opinions about redistribution are indeed sensitive
to different cross-class comparisons.

ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL COMPARISON
The investigation of the role social comparison plays in the
American response to inequality is notably missing from the
scholarly literature. A primary reason for this absence is
the difﬁculty of teasing apart social comparison from individual characteristics that affect public opinion, especially
those characteristics which also inﬂuence where people live
and with whom they come into contact in their daily lives.
We present an experiment designed to induce experiences
of social comparison, holding these other factors constant
through randomization.
We expect that inducing people to think about the social
contrasts between themselves and others of different socioeconomic status will ﬁrst generate a feeling of distance.
Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1: Subjects who contrast themselves with the most
advantaged in society will perceive greater social distance
from the wealthy and consequently rank their socioeconomic status as relatively lower, while subjects who
contrast themselves with the most disadvantaged in society will perceive greater social distance from the poor
and consequently rank their socioeconomic status as
relatively higher.
The generated perception of class contrast could then inﬂuence
opinion in two primary ways: by altering perceptions of what a
person stands to gain or lose under a more liberal policy regime
(the mechanism proposed by the canonical Romer-MeltzerRichard model) or by enhancing feelings of solidarity and identiﬁcation with the rich or the poor. Through each of these
mechanisms, perceived contrast with the wealthy would move
opinion in the liberal direction: individuals induced to perceive shared interests or greater solidarity with the poor (and
divergent interests and separation from the wealthy) should
desire increased government redistributive action. Therefore,
we hypothesize:
H2: Subjects induced to perceive greater social distance
from the wealthy and thus relatively lower social status
will express greater support for social welfare spending,
relative to those who compare themselves to the poor.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We identify the effect of perceptions of social distance on
opinion formation by tapping into individuals’ rich sociological
imaginations. Given previous research on the importance of
social comparative thinking, we argue that inducing subjects to
imagine prototypical members of different social classes should
induce changes in perception, even though we provide no new
information. Our survey experimental method is based on that
insight and takes advantage of an intervention, ﬁrst developed
by social psychologists and described in greater detail below,
that uses social comparisons to manipulate subjective perceptions of socioeconomic status (see, e.g., Kraus, Cote, and
Keltner 2010; Piff et al. 2010, 2012).
Our experiment was conducted as part of the Time-Sharing
Experiments for the Social Science (TESS) project. This is an
online panel study in which surveys are administered over the
internet by GfK, a survey research ﬁrm. Unlike the convenience
samples increasingly used in survey experiments (e.g., Amazon
Mechanical Turk), this panel is representative of US adults.
Panel members are recruited through a probability-based sampling frame that uses random-digit dial and address-based sampling methods. GfK recruits both English and Spanish speakers,
and sampled noninternet households are provided access to the
internet and hardware so that they can participate as online
panel members. A total of 985 panel members participated in
our study, 908 of whom completed the entire survey.
We ﬁrst blocked subjects by gender to increase the precision
of the estimates (Gerber and Green 2012).3 We then randomly
assigned subjects with equal probability to one of three conditions: (1) downward comparison, (2) upward comparison,
and (3) control. Subjects assigned to conditions 1 and 2 were
ﬁrst shown an image of a ladder and instructed to think of the
ladder “as representing where people stand in the United
States.” This prompt is based on the MacArthur Scale of
Subjective Social Status, a visual scale designed to capture a
sense of social status that can be applied across populations (see
Adler and Stewart [2007] for an overview and review). Subjects
assigned to either of these two conditions were then presented
with a vignette in which they were randomly assigned to think
about either very high or very low status individuals, which
makes them experience their own social standing as relatively
low or high: “Think of the people in the United States who are
the (worst/best) off: those who have the (least/most) money,
3. In addition to this advantage, we were concerned that the social
imagination-based treatment might affect women and men differently. We
report block-design adjusted standard errors (see Gerber and Green 2012,
71–77), but note that adjusting the standard errors for the blocked design
makes little difference, because we have roughly equal numbers of male
and female participants with similar reactions to the treatment (see the
appendix, available online).
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(least/most) education, and the (least/most) respected jobs. In
particular, we’d like you to think about how you are different
from these people in terms of your own income, educational
history, and job status.”4
To strengthen the manipulation, subjects assigned to the
vignettes were asked to imagine a social interaction with one of
the people they thought about and to write a few sentences
describing the interaction and then rank themselves relative to
these people at the very bottom or top. Subjects assigned to
control answered the posttreatment questions only; they did
not see the ladder, read the vignette, or place themselves on the
ladder. The full experimental protocol is available in the supplemental materials. Although we are primarily interested in
the contrast between the upward comparison and downward
comparison conditions, we include the control condition for
the purpose of benchmarking the baseline attitudes in our
sample and to compare our estimated treatment effects to other
important divisions in public opinion.
Following the experimental manipulation, we ﬁrst asked
respondents a standard question often used to measure
attitudes about economic redistribution: whether they agree
that “it is the responsibility of government to reduce income differences between rich and poor.” We measured
strength of agreement on a four-point scale, from strongly
disagree to strongly agree.
We then asked respondents about their support for speciﬁc social policies. Although public opinion surveys routinely
gauge support for redistribution by asking the generic question
about whether individuals think government should do more
to close the income gap, this item captures social policy preferences imperfectly. Americans are ideologically conservative
but programmatically liberal (see, e.g., Ellis and Stimson 2012;
Page and Jacobs 2009), so it is possible that this abstract measure may mask opinion change about speciﬁc government
action. Additionally, the generic item about government responsibility to reduce income differences may tap broad orientations toward the size of government or trust in political
institutions, rather than support for particular policy responses
to income inequality. Finally, this measure may conjure up
notions of welfare spending (i.e., beneﬁts to clearly deﬁned sets
of disadvantaged people), for which there is generally lower,
more ideologically divided support than other programs that
provide a broader base of social support and insurance, such
as education and Social Security (see, e.g., McCall 2013). Thus,

4. Following the sizable literature on the MacArthur scale, our manipulation references economic and social markers of status. This omnibus treatment allows the scale to work across cultural contexts in which people may
construct socioeconomic status with different emphasis on income, education,
and occupation.
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the generic survey item may obscure signiﬁcant heterogeneity
in attitudes toward social policy.
For these reasons, we include several policy-speciﬁc items
that measure support for different types of social spending.
These questions are adapted from the American National
Election Study and cover three policy types: means-tested programs (food stamps); contributory programs based on labor
market participation (Social Security, unemployment insurance); and opportunity-enhancing programs (federal aid for
college tuition; see, e.g., Kenworthy and McCall 2008). Respondents reported their level of support on a scale that ranged
from 0 to 100.5 We then combined these items into a single
scale of support for pragmatic social welfare spending using
factor analysis.6 We standardized both dependent variables
(reduce income differences and social welfare spending scale)
within our analytic sample (M p 0, SD p 1) to allow for
more direct comparability of treatment effects and to ease
interpretation.7

5. Although support for social welfare spending is often measured
with Likert-type scales in the American National Election Studies (ANES)
and other phone and in-person surveys, online panels more easily accommodate continuous, visual scales. We elected to use continuous scales
to avoid the loss of information that can occur when responses are forced
into a limited number of categories, and to increase our ability to detect
small changes in support. Question order was randomized for these items.
We note that in this study we also pilot tested a modiﬁcation to the ANES
policy items in which a brief description of an average program recipient
was presented with the question. The format of the spending questions
was randomly assigned and independent from status treatment assignment. Although the question version including the descriptions produced
somewhat higher support for spending across conditions than the traditional question version, there was no interaction with the social comparison treatment, and all results remain the same when controlling for
the question format.
6. Full results of the factor analysis are provided in the appendix. All
four items loaded well onto a single factor (afull sample p :80, acontrol p :79).
7. Our analytic sample incudes the 908 respondents who completed our
online survey. Results remain the same if we drop missing data for each outcome separately (see the appendix). In addition to the generic question and
spending items on which we focus the analysis, we included a different wording
of the generic item: government should do more to ensure equal opportunity.
We included this second version of the generic government action item to check
for robustness across different common framings of government action. The
second item is framed positively (increase equity rather than reduce difference),
and includes an opportunity frame. Other research has found that these differences are often important to Americans’ expressed opinions about redistributive policy (McCall 2013). Our main ﬁnding is robust across both versions
of the generic question, though there were some suggestive gender differences
across the two item wordings. To save space, we report the results for only one
version of the generic question in the text of this article. Readers can see the
appendix for the robustness check with the second, opportunity framed, generic
item.
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RESULTS
Before turning to our main results, we emphasize that our
social comparison task worked as expected; we were able to
successfully manipulate perceptions of social distance and
status. Following the vignette, we asked respondents in the
downward comparison and upward comparison conditions
to place themselves on a 10-point scale of socioeconomic
status (similar to the image of the ladder that accompanies
the vignette). Because the self-placements were part of our
status manipulations, those assigned to control did not place
themselves on this scale.

Self-placement
As hypothesized (hypothesis 1), those assigned to think
about the least advantaged (downward comparison) placed
themselves higher than those assigned to think about the
most advantaged (upward comparison). The magnitude
of the differences between the two conditions is approximately one-third of a standard deviation (M downward p 5:70,
M upward p 5:14, SEdifference p 0:14, p ! :01, two-tailed). To
place this effect in context, we compare it to the gap in selfplacement between higher-income and lower-income subjects. Respondents reported their household income in an
earlier wave of the TESS panel used to conduct our experimental study, and thus our manipulation cannot bias measures
of household income. To facilitate cross-subject comparisons,
we adjust household income by household size and for differences in cost-of-living.8 We deﬁne higher-income subjects as
those with an adjusted household income above the national
median and lower income subjects as those below the median.
The mean difference in self-placement between these two
income groups is about 1.4 rungs of the ladder; the mean
difference between the downward comparison and upward
comparison conditions is 0.56 rungs, more than one-third of
the difference between higher and lower income subjects.9
The effect on self-placement is more than just a manipulation check. That we are able to alter subjects’ perceived
socioeconomic status through such a simple imaginary interpersonal task demonstrates the signiﬁcance of social comparison to perceptions of status and inequality. It also shows
that these perceptions are relatively ﬂexible. And subjects
more accurately assessed their own status when they compared themselves to people with whom they have the least in

8. Details of our scaling approach and measures of household income
are available in the supplemental materials.
9. Prior to conducting this experiment with a nationally representative
sample, we conducted a pilot study of the intervention with a representative sample of a Midwestern state. The results of the pilot study were
similar to our main results (see the appendix).

common.10 Notably, we reduced these inaccuracies without
providing any additional information about the distribution
of income in the United States.
We did not ask subjects in our control condition to place
themselves on our 10-rung ladder, so as not to prime them to
think about cross-class comparisons prior to answering the
political attitude questions. However, to examine how people’s
subjective perception of status might respond to upward or
downward comparisons in contrast to those who were not
directed in a speciﬁc direction, we conducted a separate study
with a nonrepresentative sample of Americans. We replicated
our social comparison manipulation and included a third
treatment condition that showed subjects our ladder on which
to place themselves but did not ask them to engage in any form
of social comparison. Subjects assigned to make an upward
comparison placed themselves lower than subjects in both the
downward comparison and ladder only conditions. Similarly,
those assigned to make a downward comparison placed themselves higher than those assigned to the ladder only condition
(full results provided in the appendix). This result underscores
the robustness of our initial ﬁnding and shows that both upward
and downward comparison affect perceptions of status.

Opinion about redistributive spending
We turn now to our question of interest: whether these social
comparisons affect how Americans want to address inequality.
We begin with the opinion on whether the government should
do more to reduce income differences between rich and poor.
As shown in ﬁgure 1A, we ﬁnd no evidence that Americans
respond to upward social comparison as we expected they
would; the differences across conditions are statistically indistinguishable from zero. If we stopped here, we might conclude
that there is little connection between the way that Americans
see their own economic standing and what they want from
government. We induced change in the former and none in
the latter, at least when we ask about generic government
responsibility.
However, as we suspected, based on the work of others who
have written about attitudes on the question of generic government responsibility and pragmatic social welfare policy
preferences (e.g., Ellis and Stimson 2012; McCall 2013; Page
and Jacobs 2009), the null ﬁnding for this item masks important opinion change. Turning to the social welfare spending
scale capturing opinion about speciﬁc social policies, we ﬁnd
strong support for hypothesis 2: subjects were more supportive
of social welfare spending on speciﬁc programs when they
10. Accuracy was assessed using adjusted household income from a
prior wave of the panel. Details of this analysis are available in the supplemental materials.
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Figure 1. Social comparison and support for redistribution. The dots represent
group means, and the vertical lines represent the 84% conﬁdence interval. The
more common 95% conﬁdence intervals of two means drawn from different
distributions overlap more than 5% of the time and produces a type I error rate at
approximately the 0.006 level and not the often incorrectly presumed 0.05 level.
If one wishes to infer the two-tailed level of statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05
alpha level from the overlap of conﬁdence intervals, it is more appropriate to
specify 84% conﬁdence intervals (Goldstein and Healy 1995; cf. Arceneaux 2017).

perceived greater social distance between themselves and the
wealthy.
As shown in ﬁgure 1B, inducing perceptions of greater social
distance from the wealthy (upward comparison) increased
support for social spending compared to the other two conditions. The difference between the upward comparison and
downward comparison conditions is just over one-ﬁfth of
a standard deviation (D p 0:22, p p :005, two-tailed). The
difference between the upward comparison and control conditions is nearly one-sixth of a standard deviation (D p 0:15,
p p :08, two-tailed). Here we use our control group to put
these effect sizes into context. The difference in support for
social spending between Republicans and Democrats in the
control group is just over three-quarters of a standard deviation
(D p 0:83). The treatment effect on support for social spend-
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ing between the upward comparison and control conditions
is equivalent to approximately one-ﬁfth of this partisan gap.
Likewise, the income divide between higher-income and lowerincome subjects in our control group is nearly one-third of
a standard deviation (D p 0:32).11 The estimated treatment
effect between the upward comparison and control conditions
is nearly half this difference.
These results suggest that questions about government responsibility that are generic in scope, such as whether the
government should do more to close the gap between rich and
poor, can mask real desire for redistribution and real effects of
structural inequality and status. Inducing individuals to experience changes in relative status does little to move opinions on
whether government should reduce income differences in the
abstract. In contrast, we ﬁnd sizable treatment effects when
subjects are presented with concrete policy choices; subjects
induced to perceive greater social distance from the wealthy
prefer higher levels of social spending. This distinction lends
support to the theory that Americans are “pragmatic egalitarians” who tend to look to government for help with practical
problems, particularly when their conﬁdence in the American
dream has been undermined (Page and Jacobs 2009).
Although we have no a priori expectations about whether
opinions about particular programs drive these results, ﬁgure 2
presents treatment effects for each of the four policy items used
to construct our measure of support for social spending. On
average, subjects in the control group gave the strongest support
to Social Security (M p 65:2, SD p 23:2), followed by college
aid (M p 58:0, SD p 24:9), unemployment insurance (M p
55:8, SD p 23:6), and food stamps (M p 54:1, SD p 27:5).
We standardize each item (M p 0, SD p 1) to ease interpretation of treatment effects across policy items. For federal aid
for college tuition, food stamps, and unemployment insurance,
the differences between conditions are statistically signiﬁcant
and substantively meaningful.12 The one exception is Social
Security where we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant differences in
preferred spending across conditions. Because Social Security is
the most popular of the programs considered here—receiving

11. We deﬁne lower-income (higher-income) subjects as before, as
those with adjusted household incomes that place them below (above) the
national median household income.
12. For example, the difference in support for spending on food
stamps between self-identiﬁed Republicans and Democrats in the control
group is large, at just over three-quarters of a standard deviation (D p
0:76). The difference between the upward comparison and control conditions (D p 0:15, p p :08, two-tailed) is about one-ﬁfth this partisan
gap. The difference between the upward comparison and downward comparison conditions is nearly a quarter of this partisan gap (D p 0:18, p p :02,
two-tailed).
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Figure 2. Social comparison and support for social welfare spending by program. The dots represent group means, and the vertical lines represent the 84% conﬁdence
interval. Support is a standardized scale (mean p 0, SD p 1) that ranges from least supportive to most supportive.

the highest levels of support across socioeconomic and partisan
groups—this null result could reﬂect a ceiling effect.
In contrast to clear change induced by comparisons with the
rich, we ﬁnd no evidence that social comparison with the poor
reduces support for social spending; the downward comparison and control conditions are not statistically distinguishable
from one another. This result is also broadly consistent with
cross-national patterns, which show no increase in support for
the welfare state when the middle class is closer to the poor.
However, there are three additional possible explanations for
the null ﬁnding about downward comparison.
First, and most simply, it is entirely possible that the null
ﬁnding is the artifact of a study without the power to detect very
small differences between the control and downward comparison conditions. However, the psychological literature on
social comparison suggests a second possibility, that subjects in
the control condition—Americans who are not experimentally
induced to focus upward or downward—are thinking in similar terms to those in the downward comparison condition.
People often try to avoid upward comparison for the purposes
of ego protection (Wills 1981). This tendency to compare
downward may be enhanced by our opinion items, and a
battery of questions about social welfare programs, which draw
attention to lower-status beneﬁciaries like the poor, the unemployed, and the young may exacerbate this tendency.13 Still a
13. We know that the manipulations effectively prompted subjects in the
two treatment conditions to look up and down, but we are unable to prevent

third possibility exists; it could be that different subjects responded differently to this treatment. Downward social comparison boosted perceptions of status, but if some of our subjects felt empathy for the least advantaged (Piston 2018, but see
Sands 2017), and therefore responded to downward social
comparison with an increased desire for social spending, and
others were pulled in the opposite direction by negative stereotypes of the poor and a self-interest driven desire to avoid
redistribution, that heterogeneity could produce a null overall
effect.14
We investigate the third possibility raised above by testing
for heterogeneous treatment effects, focusing on the prominent
partisan and social divides in the American electorate. It is

subjects in the control condition from thinking in social comparative terms
unprompted. If subjects in the control condition were more likely to think
about the poor even without an intervention, then their responses might look
more like those of the subjects in the downward comparison condition. The
challenge of creating a pure control condition where no cross-class comparisons come to mind for subjects is another reason why we focus our analysis on the difference between the two treatment conditions.
14. It is also possible that rather than different groups of subjects responding in different ways to treatment, individual subjects may be pulled in
two directions by downward comparison, and rendered ambivalent. Inequalityadverse subjects in the downward comparison condition may want to minimize the lower-tail inequality to which their attention is drawn (see Fehr and
Schmidt 1999), while at the same time wanting to maximize their own interests
because they are made to feel higher. Pressured in these competing ways, they
may experience little net opinion change. We thank an anonymous reviewer
for bringing this possibility to our attention.
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fairly straightforward to compare self-identiﬁed Republicans to
self-identiﬁed Democrats, but deﬁning social cleavages is not as
simple. We adopt an intersectional analytic strategy, differentiating subjects by how their race, class, and gender position
them within structures of inequality (see, e.g., Bruch and Soss
2018). This strategy focuses attention on the intersecting
patterns of social stratiﬁcation that may govern responsiveness
to cross-class comparison (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013;
Hancock 2007).15 We compare the responses to treatment
among white men with or without a college degree, white
women with or without a college degree, and racial and ethnic
minorities with or without a college degree.16
First, we note that we found no heterogeneity along political
cleavages. Whether we compare Republicans to Democrats,
or conservatives to liberals, all responded equally to the treatments. Turning to social cleavages, in our upward comparison
condition, we ﬁnd a striking similarity across groups. Estimated
treatment effects are all in the hypothesized direction for each
of our sub-groups, with the exception of nonwhite subjects
without a college degree who appear unmoved by the experiment.17 We do ﬁnd some evidence that suggests that the null
effect for our downward comparison treatment may be driven
in part by heterogeneous treatment effects; white, collegeeducated women and men both experience opinion change in
response to downward comparison, but they move in opposite
directions, with women supporting more social spending when
prompted to contrast themselves with someone at the bottom

15. An alternative approach would be to treat social categories as mutually exclusive, parsing the sample by different markers of status, such as
education, income, race, and gender one at a time, an approach that would
obscure substantial differences in social, economic, and opinion differences
between individuals, e.g., by lumping together white men and women of color
without college degrees in an analysis cut by education only.
16. We use education to capture politically signiﬁcant class differences
given the growing divide between low-skill/low-wage, service and routine
production jobs and a high-skill/high-wage information sector, which has
resulted in substantial differences in economic wellbeing between college and
noncollege graduates (see, e.g., Autor 2014; Reardon 2013). Unfortunately,
our smaller sample of nonwhite subjects limits our ability to further differentiate these subjects by gender, race, or ethnicity. We focus on the class
divide, given increasing economic inequality within minority groups, and
outstanding questions about whether such disparities threaten racial solidarity and perceptions of linked fate (see, e.g., Hochschild and Weaver 2015).
Full results from the heterogeneity results are available in the supplemental
materials.
17. It is possible that these subjects, who expressed the highest level of
support for social spending in the control condition, already perceive a great
chasm between themselves and the socioeconomic elite; alternatively, it could
be that with a small sample of people of color without college degrees, we lack
the power to detect a small effect. Future study with larger samples of socioeconomically marginalized subjects could investigate these possibilities
further.
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of the ladder and men supporting less.18 We caution readers
that with the exception of gender, the tests for heterogeneous
treatment effects discussed in this paragraph are unplanned
comparisons, conducted without a priori expectations, and
should be read as exploratory, suggesting directions for future
inquiry on how the effects of social comparison may be refracted through individuals’ social position and status.
In sum, we ﬁnd that, as expected, when people are induced
to reﬂect on the yawning gap between themselves and those
at the top, they want government to do more. When we hold
individual characteristics like ideology and statistical ignorance constant through randomization, it becomes clear that
perceptions of socioeconomic difference have an important
effect on how Americans view redistribution. Crucially, no new
information about the income distribution needs to be provided to increase this awareness. When people are induced to
make social comparisons with the wealthy, they experience an
increased feeling of social distance, which they express by rating their own socioeconomic status lower relative to the most
advantaged. Attitudes change accordingly; subjects become
more supportive of increased spending on programs designed
to help people lift themselves up, whether it is providing individuals some security when they involuntarily lose their jobs or
ﬁnancial assistance to get a college degree. But they also become
more supportive of aid to the poor, a policy domain that previous research suggests is generally disconnected from concerns about inequality (see, e.g., McCall and Kenworthy 2009).
In this study, we observe a nationally representative sample
of American adults induced to perceive greater contrast with
the wealthy through social comparison, responding with more
support for social programs. In contrast to some aggregate,
observational evidence suggesting the opposite, we demonstrate
that Americans respond with greater support for redistribution
when conditions facilitate perceptions of greater social distance
from the elite.

CONCLUSION
Understanding the public response to economic inequality requires serious attention to the way people think about
social, relational phenomena. Decades of social psychological research show that the core of that process is social
comparison—thinking about ourselves in relation to other
18. In addition to these tests, we also considered whether subjects’ selfplacements following treatment differed by social position. For all groups, the
upward comparison treatment induced the greatest change in status perceptions among subjects without a college degree. On our generic measure of
whether government should reduce income differences between rich and
poor, we ﬁnd that the upward comparison increased support for government
action among college-educated, white women, but decreased support among
white men without a college degree. Full results are available in the appendix.
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people, but those comparisons have been largely absent from
studies of American opinion about redistribution. In contrast,
we argue that the interpersonal, social opportunities Americans have (or lack) to compare themselves to others are an essential missing link in theories of status perception and opinion formation. Here we have tested the basic psychological
process at the foundation of the social perception approach,
ﬁnding evidence that people use social comparison to gauge
the distance between themselves and the extremes of the income distribution, and that the sense of social distance they
develop changes what they want from government.
We see three primary avenues for future research on the social perception of inequality. First, our results suggest that when
it comes to inequality and public opinion, the exceptionality
may lie in the American context, rather than the American
individual. If the current unequal income distribution was
altering the social experiences of Americans, then we would expect opinion change to follow. Indeed, even after brief, imagined cross-class comparison experiences, our subjects became
more supportive of social spending. The contextual factors that
structure social comparison opportunities warrant increased
scholarly attention. For several reasons, it appears that the kind
of upward comparison that increases support has become less
common in the United States as inequality has increased. As
economic inequality has grown over the last half century, so
has economic segregation. These two trends should no longer
be studied in isolation from one another. Instead, we might
think about them as countervailing forces. Of particular signiﬁcance is the fact that the socioeconomic elite are invisible to most Americans, geographically concentrated in cities,
neighborhoods, and even gated communities. The growing spatial isolation of wealth has made it less likely that ordinary
Americans encounter the afﬂuent other. Instead, they are increasingly surrounded by those who are on a similar rung as
themselves.19
But this does not mean we should expect support for
redistribution to spring invariably from contact between the
classes. Individuals’ frames of reference can vary dramatically,
depending on psychological and structural factors. Psychologists caution that an individual’s “place in the local environment does not straightforwardly predict comparison choices

19. This visibility also varies substantially across the country. Rural
communities, for example, tend to be more egalitarian than urban ones,
making cross-class social comparisons less likely. Although it is beyond
the scope of our research, it is possible that these differences in the social
visibility and proximity of the wealthy elite explain why social protests
over income inequality, like the Occupy movement, erupt in Manhattan,
and why rural Americans focus more on inequalities between places rather
than between classes (see, e.g., Cramer 2016).

or interpretation” (Smith et al. 2012, 206). Importantly, most
individuals prefer to engage in more comfortable comparisons with others of a similar social station, and avoid upward
comparison (Wheeler and Miyake 1992; Wood 1989). People
who feel threatened, anxious, or uncertain are particularly
likely to avoid upward comparison, focusing instead on the
downward comparisons that boost perceptions of status
(Fiske 2011) or downplaying the importance of economic
status, focusing instead on “moral criteria of success that are
available to all” (Lamont 2000, 100; see also Cramer 2016).
These insights lead us to theorize that there is an additional
countervailing force limiting upward comparison. Even beyond class segregation, the insecurity produced by growing
inequality could itself prevent Americans from thinking about
the very upward comparisons that induce support for redistributive government action.
Racial and gender difference can also exacerbate feelings of
social contrast, while similarity can make social distances feel
smaller. Lupu and Pontusson attribute the American exceptionalism in their study of redistributive spending to the “high
concentrations of racial-ethnic minorities in the bottom of the
income distribution” (2011, 329), an idea that is consistent with
several comparative studies that link racial and ethnic diversity
to lower levels of redistributive spending (see, e.g., Alesina and
Glaeser 2004) and ﬁnd that attitudes about redistribution toward the poor grow more conservative as inequality and racial
diversity increase in a nation (Cavaillé and Trump 2015). Public policy in the United States is highly racialized and gendered;
media and elite discourse deﬁne and reinforce public images of
program recipients that easily activate racial and gender resentments (Gilens 1999; Hancock 2004; Winter 2008). It is
possible that if white middle- and working-class Americans
construct the socioeconomic elite as white, or men construct
the elite as male, they may be less likely to think in terms of
contrast when comparing upward, as we induce them to do in
our experiment, dampening the effects of any upward comparisons they do make.
All of these factors—class segregation, perceptions of risk
and economic anxiety, race, and gender—govern whether people look up, look down, or avoid comparisons altogether. In
a sense, they determine whether Americans’ real world experiences look like those in our upward comparison, downward comparison, and control conditions. Along these lines,
more work is needed to test expectations about how the effects of social comparison may differ based on individuals’
positioning within the socioeconomic hierarchy. Our examination of heterogeneity within our sample suggests possible
starting points for this line of inquiry. We emphasize here that
social identities are multidimensional and that markers of status, including race, ethnicity, and gender, are neither additive,
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nor mutually exclusive (see, e.g., Hancock 2007; McCall and
Orloff 2017). Moving forward, the study of inequality and
public opinion will beneﬁt from greater attention to these
broader social conditions that foster or inhibit cross-class social
comparisons, and how these comparisons are shaped by social
identities, lived experiences of inequality, and socioeconomic
circumstances.
The second avenue we see for research on the social perception of inequality is mediated cross-class contact. While
Americans may lack contact with the socioeconomic elite on
the street, they do experience it on the page and the screen.
Modern celebrity culture, reality television programming, and
popular ﬁctional characters offer opportunity for a form of
upward comparison. Whether or not such opportunities function like the interpersonal comparisons we have studied is an
open question, but we are skeptical that media images of wealth
help Americans make sense of income disparities in ways that
increase feelings of distance; instead mediated contact with the
wealthy is often carefully crafted to make people feel a closeness
or personal connection to rich celebrities—to make the experience pleasurable and keep fans coming back for more (e.g.,
Lueck 2015). Similarly, although the rich can be the subject of
news coverage, media outlets have a great deal of ﬂexibility with
how the elite are framed. For example, framing them as overpaid government bureaucrats or city dwelling “takers” may
produce images of the rich that are consistent with reduced
support for redistribution, leading to the type of thinking observed in, for example, rural Wisconsin (Cramer 2016). The
point is that mediated contact can be intentionally crafted to
meet many goals, potentially producing different effects from
the sort of interpersonal comparisons at the core of our study.
Such ﬂexible mediated cross-class contact experiences may be
particularly important given the shrinking opportunity for
interpersonal contact in our segregated society.
Third and ﬁnally, future studies could dig more deeply into
the mechanisms connecting the cross-class comparison to
opinion. We raised two possibilities earlier. First, the mechanism may be simple self-interest. People who compare upward
and see themselves as relatively lower on the ladder may think
they stand to gain more (or lose less), resulting in more support
for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Romer 1975).
Alternatively, cross-class social comparison may affect opinion
through group identiﬁcation—increasing solidarity, warmth,
and perhaps empathy with the class to which the subject is
made to feel closer, even in the absence of an altered view of
self-interest. Finally, we note that a third possible mechanism
exists. By priming people to think of the rich or the poor in
social terms, we may be bringing different values and considerations to the top of their minds, making upper- or lower-tail
inequality more or less salient or activating racial and class
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biases, and altering opinion in the process. Based on existing
literature across disciplines, we think it is likely that each of
these mechanisms plays a role. Our experiment was not designed to parse these pathways, but that is a logical next step for
studies of the social perception of inequality to take.
In sum, taking seriously the fact that humans are social
thinkers points to a different way forward for the study of
inequality and political attitudes. Instead of focusing on factual ignorance, individual, absolute resources, and objective
markers of status, scholars should turn to the structural factors
that generate interpersonal perceptions of status. Americans
know the basic fact that income gaps are large and growing
(McCall 2013), but for many people, rising inequality remains
socially invisible. Rather than ask what’s the matter with Americans, we ought to look carefully at how American society obstructs the upward comparisons that make inequality real
in the social mind.
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